Sri Dharampal' s essay, as is indeed obvious, is addressed not to scholars of Indian tradition but to the lay bearers of the tradition, urging them to. come out of their state of forgetfulness and drift, and anchor themselves within their essential Indian-ness with awareness and responsibility. Given the nature of the enterprise, some of the statements in the essay were put in a form that may seem sweepingly general. In a more scholarly context such statements would have required extensive qualification and particularization. Many of the questions, doubts, and apprehensions that were raised in the symposium seem to arise from such a want· of detailed qualification and particularization.
While agreeing with the concerns of the participants in this regard, we do wish to point out that studies of India have often concentrated on· the differences and diversities in the details of Indian thought, and we shall probably only be restoring the balance if we ignore the details for a while . and concentrate on the larger unified picture of the Indian view of humanity and the world.
Sri Dharampal is not unaware of the . . differences and diversities that prevail in India, not only between the people who claim to be the bearers of the classical Indian tradition and those who have made India their home 'in the relatively recent past, but also between different schools and interpretations of the timeless Indian The tenns parti and aparti have to an extent become part of the lay vocabulary of many Indians, and in the current conversational usage these are taken to correspond to the "spiritual" and· the "material" pursuits respectively. In the lay usage of some sections of contemporary Indian society there is also a tendency to see a hierarchy between these two and to place the people engaged in the former pursuits higher than those engaged in the latter. Sri Dharampal, while discussing the question of parti and aparti, is probably referring to these lay usages and trying to convey to Indians that this tendency to categorize people and pursuits as high and low is not sanctioned by classical Indian thought.
In a rig9rous sense, the terms parti and aparti have quite a different meaning than what is conveyed and understood by the terms "spiritual" and "material". The categories implied by the "spiritual" and the "material" probably are not legitimate categories in Indian thought, but whatever is conveyed by these terms would fall entirely within the domain of the aparti.
The terms parti and aparti originally appear in the MUI}~akopani~ad, which belongs to the Atharvaveda. Almost at the very beginning of the upanisad the great householder, Mahasrua Saun~a, asks the great sage Ailgira about the one by knowing whom all is known: "kasminnu bhagavo vijiititam bhavati". (I.1.3) Beginning his answer to this fundamental question of Saunaka rsi Ailgira says that those who know recommend two kinds of knowledge as worth knowing, the parti and the aparti: "dve vidye veditavye ltl na sma yadbrahmavido vadanti parti caivtiparti" (1.1.4). And immediately following this, !~i Ailgira defmes aparti and parti in these terms: tatrapara ~gvedo yajurvedaJ::t samavedo'tharvavedah sik~a kalpo vyakara1:larb. niruktarb. chanda jyotisamiti. atha para yaya tadak~~amadhigamyate. (1.1.5).
Rgveda yajurveda, samaveda, and atharvaveda, as also sik~a, kalpa, vyak~a, nirukta, chandas and jyoti~a are apara vidya. And, para is the knowledge through which the unmanifest Brahman is known, of whom we shall speak below.
Thus all the four vedas and the six vediiflgas are here counted as forming the domain of aparti vidya. The vedas an.d vedtiflgas together, as is well known, are said' to encompass all knowledge in the world, including all that is said about the un-sayable Brahman as well as whatever is known of the varied arts and crafts; and r:~i Ailgira says that all these belong to the aparti.
SrI Adisailkaracarya, commenting on the upani~ad, emphasizes that the definition of aparti above includes even the text of upani~ad itself; the upani~ads speak of and teach about the parti, but the upani~ads themselves do not belong to the domain of the parti: "upni~advedytik~aravi~ayarh hi vijfitinamiha parti vidyeti prtidhtinyena vivaksitam nopanisatchabdarasih".
SrI Sailkaracarya of course' has taught that in order to achieve mok~a one must give up all karmas, including the karmas recommended in the vedas, and thus for him it is perhaps natural to emphasize that vedas and upani~ads in themselves are part of the apara, which must all be left behind in order to achieve moksa. But even those belonging to the Srlvai~r:tava school, for whom the undertaking of the karmas recommended in the vedas is an important part of the path to mok~a, have no hesitation in saying that the vedas as the corpus of indirect knowledge of Brahman belong to the apara, and it is the direct seeing of Brahman that constitutes para. Apara thus encompasses all thinking and action -all that happens, is performed, or is thought of within the manifest world is apara. And therefore not only the pursuits of the peasant and the artisan, but also of the student of the vecdas and the performer of the vaidika rituals and actions, and even the corpus of the vedas and upani~ads itself, . belong to the apara. Para vidya refers only to the direct seeing, the pratyalqa darsana, of the unmanifest, undifferentiated one Brahman from whom the multiplicity of the manifest, differentiated world arises. But acquiring such darsana is in fact the same as achieving moksa and becoming one with Brahman; about the one who knows Brahman thus, the MUr:t9akopani~ad says: sa yo ha vai tatparanam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati ..
. (III.2.9).
There is indeed a hierarchy of para and apara, but this hierarchy can have no implication for any of the human pursuits in the world, these all belong to the apara. This, of course, does not prove that there is no hierarchy amongst people and pursuits in India, but only that such hierarchy is not· based on anything as fundamental as the distinction between the manifest world and the unmanifest Brahman. The distinction The question of hierarchy in the social organization of human life in India has been made somewhat complex by the great amount of attention that has been paid to it by scholars and social refonners alike. The subject needs a more detailed treatment than was possible in Sri Dharampal's short essay. But Prof. Nelson's assertion that when "souls are at different stages in their transmigratory ascent towards mok~a, the idea of hierarchy is unavoidable" seems rather simplistic. In fact, for the mumulqu there are never any constraints of vaTf}O-; individuals of all varnas are entitled to and are known to have achieved the direct dar sana of Brahman which is moksa. The bhakti traditions of India are widely known to have asserted the entitlement of all varnas to moksa; and the great jfianamiirgi SrI . Adisattkaracarya in his commentary on Brahmasiitra, recalling the great jfiiinfs of the sUdra vanta such as Vidura and Dharmavyadha, asserts that anyone who has achieved the jfiiina, to whatever vaTf!a he may belong, cannot be denied the phaZa of the jfiana, which indeed is immediate direct darsana of. Brahman:
The issue of hierarchy in the Indian social order of course needs much elaboration. We may, however, suggest that according to what we understand of India, it is not the hierarchy between different groups and pursuits that ~haracterizes the Indian way of social organization, but their separate and distinctive identity. Such emphasis on distinctiveness of groups organized around different kinds of pursuits, or around· different localities and religious practices, does subject the individual to the discipline of the group, but it also imbues the group with a more or less unabridgeable sovereignty within the polity. We have discussed this characteristic of the Indian polity in some detail in an earlier essay in Ayodhya and the Future India, a 1993 compilation edited by one of the authors (JB). But, whether a polity organized around individuals or around sovereign groups is a better way of human organization is a question that shall have to be debated at some stage.
Finally, a few words about the question of compassionately interpreting Indian thought, which Sri Dharampal raises in the concluding sections of his essay. We feel that the term could have been avoided. In the context of Vedavyasa's exposition of Indian thought in the purfu.1as, the term does not convey much. Vedavyasa does not interpret Indian thought, he conveys it to us. Almost the whole of the corpus of Indian thought, compnsmg the Vedas, Mahabharata, brahmasiitra, and the purru:as, comes to us through Vedavyasa. His compassion thus permeates all Indian thought.
But webelieve that compassion is indeed not a relevant category in the Indian way of thinking. In India important questions of life and society are not left to the morality or ethics of the individual. What is emphasized in India, on the other hand, is clarity of intellect and discipline in thought and action, and it is believed that the order that flows from such clarity and discipline shall indeed be a dhtirmika order in which all shall find a place and all shall be taken care of. This issue too needs 'much detailed exposition, and we discuss some aspects of it in one of our forthcoming publications, Annam Bahu Purvita: The Indian Discipline of Growing and Sharing Food in Plenty. We may however mention that the concept of caring , for all is of such central importance in the dharmasammata polity that a highly regarded ka/pa text like Apastambadharmasiltra, laying down the principles, of rtijadharma, advises the king to arrange the polity such that: na ciisya vi~aye k~udhii roge'f'l himatapiibhyam va 'vasidedabhaviidbuddhipurvam va ka §cit. (2.25.11) .
Let no 'one suffer from hunger and disease or from extremes of heat and cold. Noone in the country ought to suffer thus either because of general scarcity or because of specific design against him.
Such caring in India was never thought of as a matter of compassion or charity, but of dharma, the discipline of being hlnnail.
